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Abstract
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heterogeneous rms and workers meet directly and randomly, and negotiate
salaries with each other over time. Firms and workers may not have a com-
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rms and
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11 Introduction
The idea that decentralized market processes where self-interested buyers and sellers
make independent decisions freely can settle a market on a competitive equilibrium
outcome, can be traced back at least to Adam Smith (1776), who coined the famous
term, the Invisible Hand, to describe the self-regulating nature of an uncoordinated
market. The objective of this paper is to develop and analyze a decentralized market
process for a basic labor market with nitely many heterogeneous rms and workers.
This process intends to mimic and reect the decentralized decision making process in
real competitive labor markets, where rms and workers meet directly and randomly,
and negotiate salaries with each other over time. Here agents may not have a com-
plete picture of the entire labor market and can thus behave myopically. Using this
framework, we investigate the market outcomes of such decentralized and random
processes.
The theoretical literature on market processes has predominantly focused on and
has also been remarkably successful in analyzing and designing centralized processes
for various markets.1 Nevertheless, many competitive markets, labor markets be-
ing a leading example, feature bilateral (job) oers and are typically decentralized
(see Roth and Vande Vate (1990), Samuelson and Nordhaus (2010)). Indeed, it is
widely observed in labor markets that a worker sequentially works for several em-
ployers because a latter employer oers a better salary than a previous employer
does; and conversely, a same rm hires dierent workers over time for the same po-
sition as workers who come later may either work more eciently or demand lower
salaries. In addition, it is not uncommon to see that a worker eventually returns to
her previous employer but with a dierent contract. In a labor market where many
rms and workers are matched randomly and dynamically, and each agent makes
her own decisions independently, possibly by only looking at myopic gains, a natural
and important question is then \will such seemingly chaotic, random and dynamic
decentralized processes eventually lead the market to an equilibrium state in which
a system of competitive salaries exists and simultaneously meets the needs of both
rms and workers?"
This paper attempts to resolve the above question in the armative. Briey
speaking, we consider a labor market with nite and heterogeneous workers and
rms. Each worker can be matched with a rm, generating a joint surplus, which can
1See for example, Gale and Shapley (1962) for marriage matching problems; Shapley and Scarf
(1974) for housing markets; Crawford and Knoer (1981), Kelso and Crawford (1982), and Crawford
(2008) for job matching problems; Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986), Gul and Stacchetti (2000),
Milgrom (2000), Ausubel (2006), Sun and Yang (2009) for auction markets; Roth (1984), Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) for the US medical residency match; Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez (2003),
Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak and Roth (2005) for school choice problems; and Ostrovsky (2008) for
supply chain network. Stock markets and auction markets are typically centralized. AEA annual
meeting provides a place for junior economists to meet their future potential academic employers.
But this is not a centralized market.
2be split freely between the two agents (interpreted as salaries). Given an allocation
which consists of a matching between the rms and workers and a scheme of salary
oers, a rm and a worker, currently not matched with each other, can block the
allocation, resulting in a salary oer which makes both better o and at least one of
them strictly so. Such a procedure is called a pair improvement of the allocation. A
pair improvement can be intuitively regarded as a particular form of bilateral trade
arising from the previous allocation. Like a bilateral transaction, a pair improvement,
while benecial for the pair involved, may hurt other agents, resulting in a decrease
in total welfare of the market. In this framework, we establish that, starting from
an arbitrary initial market state (an allocation), there exists a nite sequence of
successive myopic pair improvements leading to a stable matching between rms and
workers with a scheme of competitive salary oers. An important implication of this
result is that a general random process where every possible pair improvement is
chosen with a positive probability converges with probability one to a competitive
equilibrium of the labor market.
The general random process is permissive in that it allows for random, chaotic
and cyclical bilateral trading scenarios where rms' and workers' behavior might be
only myopically oriented, and partnerships between rms and workers can be formed
hastily and can also dissolve instantly whenever better opportunities arise. In our
opinion, such a random market process presents a satisfactory illustration of the trad-
ing behavior in a real uncoordinated market. In addition, myopic pair improvements
(bilateral trades) before reaching stability can be simply interpreted as haggling ac-
tivities where workers retain oers or sellers hold their goods without committing
themselves until equilibrium (stability) is reached. Alternatively, these pair improve-
ments can also be regarded as transactions that take place in real-time, where workers
move from job to job and rms terminate existing employment relationships and cre-
ate new job oers.
The current study is most closely related to the seminal work by Crawford and
Knoer (1981) and Roth and Vande Vate (1990). Crawford and Knoer (1981) ana-
lyzed a labor market with nitely many self-interested and heterogeneous rms and
workers. They proposed a centralized market process | a salary adjustment process
which always converges to a stable assignment of workers to rms with a scheme of
competitive salaries.2 Our model is similar to theirs but our goal and results dier
essentially from theirs in that our process is decentralized and the associated algo-
rithm nds an equilibrium in nitely many steps, whereas theirs is centralized and
approaches an equilibrium through a limiting argument.3
2Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Crawford (2008) generalized and extended both this model and
the centralized market process to more complex scenarios where each rm may hire several workers.
Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) improved and rened the market process of Crawford and
Knoer (1981) so that their new process always leads to an equilibrium in nitely many steps.
More recently, several general auction (price adjustment) processes have been proposed by Gul and
Stacchetti (2000), Milgrom (2000), Ausubel (2006), Sun and Yang (2009) among others.
3Crawford and Knoer (1981) rst proved that their process always converges to a core element
3Our decentralized process is in spirit close to Roth and Vande Vate (1990), who
reexamined the Gale-Shapley marriage matching model. In this model, Gale and
Shapley (1962) proved the existence of a stable marriage matching via a centralized
process | the deferred acceptance procedure, while Roth and Vande Vate (1990)
proposed a decentralized process which converges to a stable matching.4 Our study
diers from Roth and Vande Vate (1990) in three crucial aspects: rst, in the Gale-
Shapley model examined by Roth and Vande Vate, money is not explicitly involved
and side payment is not allowed; second, their solution of stability corresponds to
core, whereas our solution of stability with exible salaries coincides with both strict
core and competitive equilibrium; third, in our model because salaries are exible
and weak pair improvements have to be employed, it is crucial to design an elaborate
and novel approach to tackle cycles which typically arise in our decentralized setting.
Our analysis also bears some similarity with the literature on t^ atonnement pro-
cesses, which studies equilibrium stability and how market-clearing prices and ecient
allocations are reached with the coordination of a ctitious market maker. Since the
rst t^ atonnement process formulated by Leon Walras in 1874, the study of such pro-
cesses has been a major issue of economic research. Some of the early contributions
on t^ atonnement processes include Samuelson (1941), Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) and
Scarf (1960, 1973). Compared with t^ atonnement processes, our analysis provides an
arguably more satisfactory market process toward equilibrium allocations and prices
in real economic systems in that our market process is random and decentralized,
and that agents could trade on markets sequentially and trade could take place all
the time, even at disequilibrium prices. In particular, our market processes do not
exclude chaotic and cyclical behavior commonly observed in real economic systems.
In earlier related literature, Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik
(1972) examined the existence and structure issues of competitive equilibrium in
assignment markets without discussing any market process. Feldman (1974) and
Green (1974) studied similar problems and obtained convergent processes for certain
subclasses of NTU games. But their approaches do not apply to the labor market or
matching models where signicant indivisibility is involved.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 provides preliminary results concerning weak stability. The main results towards
stability are established in Section 4. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
Omitted proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
in nitely many steps. Then they showed by a limiting argument that their process approaches a
strict core element (i.e., an equilibrium). Notice that their process can nd an allocation that is as
close to an equilibrium as one wishes in nite time.
4Following Roth and Vande Vate (1990), several decentralized processes have been developed for
closely related markets; see Chung (2000), Diamantoudi, Miyagawa and Xue (2006) for roommate
matching problems; Klaus and Klijn (2007) for matching problems with couples; Kojima and  Unver
(2008) for many-to-many matching problems. In all these models, side payment is not allowed, and
various notions of stability (but not competitive equilibrium) are used.
42 The Model
Consider a labor market with nitely many heterogeneous rms and workers. For-
mally, let F and W be two nite disjoint sets of agents, containing jFj rms and
jWj workers, respectively. We assume that each rm hires at most one worker and
each worker accepts at most one job.5 A matching  in the labor market is simply a
one-to-one mapping from F [W to itself such that (i) ((x)) = x for all x 2 W [F,
and (ii) each agent is either self-matched ((x) = x), or is matched to a member of
the other side (for x 2 W, (x) 6= x implies (x) 2 F, and for x 2 F, (x) 6= x
implies (x) 2 W), in which case (x) is said to be a partner of x.
Denote V (f;w) and s(f;w), respectively, as worker w's productivity and salary
at rm f. When a worker w does not work for any rm, his utility is represented
by V (w;w), while if a rm f does not hire any worker, her productivity or utility is
denoted by V (f;f). 6 For any agent x 2 F [ W, value V (x;x) can be alternatively
interpreted as agent x's outside options (or, for workers, unemployment benets)
when x is self-matched. Notice that we allow for heterogeneous outside options for
the agents. Salaries, together with the parameters V (f;w), V (w;w) and V (f;f),
are paid in transferable monetary units. As a result, worker w's total utility at rm f
is V (f;w) s(f;w). We assume that values V (f;w), V (w;w) and V (f;f) are integers
for all f 2 F and w 2 W. These values are measured in monetary units and hence
are naturally assumed to be integers. We denote this labor market by (F;W;V ).
Given a matching , let I() = fh 2 F[W j (h) = hg be the set of members who
are self-matched at . We call the quantity of
P
f2FnI() V (f;(f)) +
P
i2I() V (i;i)
the market value associated with the matching . Moreover, we say that a matching













If  is ecient, then we call quantity
P
f2FnI() V (f;(f)) +
P
i2I() V (i;i) the ef-
cient market value, or the ecient value, of the labor market and denote it by
V (F [ W); which is the same for all ecient matchings.
An economic outcome, or simply an allocation, of the labor market consists of a
matching  and a payo vector u 2 RF[W such that u(x) = V (x;x) for any x 2 I();
and u(x)+u((x)) = V (x;(x)) for any x = 2 I(). An allocation (;u) is individually
rational if u(x)  V (x;x) for all x 2 F [W. Notice that for each allocation (;u) in
a labor market (F;W;V ), the payo vector u uniquely denes a salary vector s where
s((w);w) = u(w), for matched/employed worker w, and s((w);w) = V (w;w),
i.e., w's unemployment benet, for self-matched/unemployed worker w. With this
5This is the unit-demand assumption, which has been employed in Shapley and Shubik (1972),
Crawford and Knoer (1981), Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (2006) and others.
6When a worker or a rm stays idle, then the worker gets no salary from any rm and the rm
pays nothing to any worker.
5convention, it is thus sucient for us to employ the utility vector u in lieu of the
description of the salary vector s for each allocation hereafter.
A natural notion of solution for our setting is that of stability. An allocation (;u)
is stable or a strict core allocation if u(f) + u(w)  V (f;w) for all f 2 F, w 2 W,
and u(x)  V (x;x) for all x 2 F [W. Namely, an allocation is stable if every worker
(rm) has the option of remaining idle and the allocation is not blocked, to be dened
shortly, by any pair of rm and worker. It is easy to show that if (;u) is a stable
allocation and  is an ecient matching, then (;u) is stable and  is also ecient.
We now introduce two notions of blocking pairs: weakly blocking pairs and
strongly blocking pairs. A pair (f;w) of rm f and worker w weakly blocks an
allocation (;u) if rm f and worker w are not matched under  but both can weakly
improve their well-being by matching with each other and abandoning their partners
at . Namely, there are rf 2 R and rw 2 R such that rf + rw = V (f;w) and
rw  u(w) and rf  u(f) with at least one strict inequality. For our purpose, we
also say that (;u) is weakly blocked by a pair of (x;x) if x 2 F [W is not matched
to herself at  but prefers being single to being matched with (x), i.e., x 6= (x)
but rx = V (x;x) > u(x).
A pair (f;w) is said to strongly block an allocation (;u) if rm f and worker w
are not matched under  but both can strictly improve their well-being by matching
with each other and abandoning their partners at . Namely, there are rf 2 R and
rw 2 R such that rf + rw = V (f;w) and rf > u(f) and rw > u(w). Similarly, we
also say (;u) is strongly blocked by a pair of (x;x) if x 2 F [ W is not matched to
herself at  but prefers being single to being matched with (x), i.e., x 6= (x) but
rx = V (x;x) > u(x).
Given the denitions of blocking pairs, we can alternatively say that an allocation
(;u) is stable if there is no pair that weakly blocks (;u). Similarly, we call an allo-
cation (;u) weakly stable or a core allocation if there is no pair that strongly blocks
(;u). By denition, a weakly stable allocation is weaker than a stable allocation, in
that there might be eciency losses in a weakly stable allocation compared with a
stable one.
Evidently, the above model of a labor market can also be regarded as a general
assignment market with nitely many buyers and sellers and integral valuations.
Here, each seller is in possession of an indivisible good, which is valued possibly
dierently by the buyers. Given this specication, V (i;j) is then interpreted as the
net monetary surplus associated with the partnership of buyer i and seller j, while
s(i;j) is simply the price that buyer i is charged for seller j's good.
It is well known in the literature (e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1972), and Crawford
and Knoer (1981)) that a job assignment market including the current labor market
has at least one competitive equilibrium, and that the set of stable allocations (i.e.,
strict core) coincides with that of competitive equilibria.7 An additional important
feature of the labor market is that as all values V (f;w), V (f;f) and V (w;w) are
7Let s 2 RW be a salary vector of which sw is the salary allocated to worker w. For s 2 RW,
6integers, and the structure of the market is totally unimodular, the market must have
at least one stable outcome with an integral payo vector u 2 ZF[W, which implicitly
denes an integral salary scheme s 2 ZW. We can therefore restrict ourselves solely
to the domain of integer payos. Namely, it is sucient to consider only weakly
(strongly) blocking pairs with integer payos. Henceforth, all values and salaries to
be discussed will be integral.
As a blocking pair may result in multiple allocations, arising from dierent spec-
ications of wages or surplus division rules, we dene an additional basic concept of
pair improvement so as to fully describe the process from a blocking pair. In gen-
eral, let (f;w) be a blocking pair of an allocation (;u). Introduce a new allocation
(0;u0) via the blocking pair (f;w) such that (1) 0(x) = (x) and u0 (x) = u(x) for
any x 2 (F [W)nff;w;(f);(w)g, (2) under 0, f and w are matched, while (f)
and (w) are self-matched, and (3) u0 (f) = rf and u0 (w) = rw such that rf + rw =
V (f;w), while u0 ((f)) = V ((f);(f)) and u0 ((w)) = V ((w);(w)). We
say that (0;u0) is a pair improvement of (;u) through the blocking pair (f;w). We
also distinguish weak pair improvements from strong pair improvements, depending
on whether the associated blocking pair (f;w) is weak or strong.8 As described pre-
viously, a pair improvement mimics a real transaction between a rm and a worker
and can thus be naturally interpreted as a specic form of bilateral trade. Hereafter,
we sometimes state a pair improvement as, more intuitively, a bilateral trade in our
discussion.
As stated before, our central objective is to analyze the market outcomes of a
decentralized and random process where rms and workers meet directly and ran-
domly, and negotiate salaries with each other over time. For this purpose, the rst
issue we have to deal with is the existence of a nite sequence of successive bilat-
eral trades toward a stable allocation from any initial allocation. The following
examples demonstrate that an arbitrary sequence of successive weak or strong pair
improvements may induce trading cycles.
First consider the case of weak pair improvements. A very simple example of
this is a labor market (F;W;V ) where F = ftg , W = fx;yg, V (t;x) = V (t;y) =
2, and V (i;i) = 0 for all i 2 F [ W. Consider an initial allocation (0;u0) =
dene the demand set of rm f 2 F by
Df (s) =
fw j V (f;w)   sw  V (f;f) and V (f;w)   sw  V (h;f)   sh;8h 2 Wg
[ff j V (f;f)  V (h;f)   sh;8h 2 Wg:
A pair (;s) is a competitive equilibrium if (1) (h) 2 Dh(s) for all h 2 F; (2) sw  V (w;w) for all
w 2 W, and (w) = w implies sw = V (w;w) for all w 2 W.
It is easy to show that (;s) is a competitive equilibrium if and only if (;u) is stable, where
u(w) = sw for all w 2 W, u(f) = V ((f);f)   s(f) for all f 2 F with (f) 6= f, and u(f) =
V (f;f) for all f 2 F with (f) = f.
8A pair improvement from a weakly or strongly blocking pair initiated by a single agent can be













, where we list the agents' (integral) payos below the matching.











, while (1;u1) is further weakly blocked by (t;x), which leads to
exactly (0;u0), completing the cycle.
Our next example shows that cycles may also arise under strong pair improve-
ments. Notice in particular that this example also shows that the market value may
not be monotonic along a path of pair improvements.
Example 1 Consider a labor market (F;W;V ) with F = fa;bg; W = fx;yg, and
V (i;i) = 0; 8i 2 F [ W, V (a;i) = 4 and V (b;i) = 5; 8i 2 W:
We start with an initial allocation (0;u0) with 0 = f(a;x), (b;b)g , (y;y) and
u0 (a) = u0 (x) = 2 and u0 (i) = 0 otherwise.



































































































Both examples illustrate the complexity of nding a deterministic path of pair
improvements toward (weak) stability in that the choices of both surplus division rules
and blocking pairs are important. The examples also demonstrate that an arbitrary
decentralized market process does not guarantee convergence to (weak) stability.
3 A Preliminary Result on Weak Stability
To be instructive, we begin with a preliminary result on the existence of a nite
path of (strong) pair improvements toward weakly stable allocation, starting from
8an arbitrary allocation of the labor market. A direct consequence of this result is
that the random process where each possible strong pair improvement is chosen with
positive probability eventually converges to a weakly stable allocation of the market.9
To establish the existence of a nite path toward weakly stable allocation, the key
issue is to make sure that the trading process consisting of myopic bilateral trades will
not be stuck in some endless cycles. To this end, observe rst that, as demonstrated in
Example 1, each pair improvement only results in payo improvements for the players
involved in the blocking pair associated with the pair improvement. This indicates
that the market value may decrease after a pair improvement as the abandoned
partner's payo will most likely decrease. Consequently, constructing a nite path of
successive strong pair improvements that builds on the monotonicity of the market
value is dicult. We instead employ the niteness of agents and construct a sequence
of sets of agents with increasing sizes. For weak stability, such a construction is
relatively easy, as both agents involved in a pair are strictly better o after a strong
pair improvement, enabling one to invoke certain payo monotonicity in constructing
the sets. For the existence of a nite path of weak pair improvements toward stability,
however, the construction is much more involved and demanding so as to precisely
deal with trading cycles that arise in the process, as we shall see in the next section.
Specically, the basic idea of achieving weak stability is to construct a sequence
of monotonically increasing sets of rms and workers such that the rms and workers
in any such set do not form strongly blocking pairs. Such process proceeds until no
strongly blocking pair can be found in the market, establishing weak stability. Roth
and Vande Vate (1990) used a similar idea for the marriage matching model where
money is absent. Our construction of the monotonically increasing sets, however, also
includes proper specications of wages or surplus division rules for strongly blocking
pairs, resulting in dierent and, in some aspects, more involved arguments than theirs.
Theorem 1 Consider a labor market (F;W;V ) with an arbitrary initial allocation
(0;u0). There exists a nite number of consecutive strong pair improvements which
lead to a weakly stable allocation (;u).
To prove the theorem, we rst present the Basic Algorithm, which carries an arbi-
trary individually rational allocation to a weakly stable allocation in the labor market
(F;W;V ).
Basic Algorithm
Step 1: If (0;u0) is weakly stable, stop with output (0;u0). Otherwise, there is
a strongly blocking pair (f1;w1) with V (f1;w1)  u0 (f1) + u0 (w1) + 2. Match f1
with w1. Dene K (1) to be f(f1;w1)g and let the updated allocation be (1;u1). In
addition, let u1 (f1) = u0 (f1)+1, u1 (w1) = V (f1;w1) u1 (f1); 0 (i), i 2 ff1;w1g,
if any, obtains u1 (0 (i)) = V (0 (i);0 (i)); and for all other x, let u1 (x) = u0 (x).10
9This is an immediate corollary of Proposition 1 in Section 4.
10The (initial) wage specication between f1 and w1 is inessential: any rule such that both f1 and
w1 are strictly better o than before will do.
9Dene an index n and put n   1.
Step 2: If (n;un) is weakly stable, then stop. Otherwise, there is a blocking pair
(fn;wn) of (n;un) such that (fn;wn) = 2 K (n):11 Distinguish three cases:
Case 1. If wn 2 K (n) (hence fn 2 (F [ W)nK (n)), then fn is the initiator
of the next blocking pair, who chooses wn where wn 2 argmaxw2K(n)[V (fn;w)-
un (fn)-un (w)] (choose arbitrarily if there are several such wn's). Update the alloca-
tion to be (n+1;un+1) so that fn is matched with wn; un+1 (wn) = un (wn) + 1
and un+1 (fn) = V (fn;wn)   un+1 (wn); un+1 (x) = un (x) for unaected x and
un+1 (y) = V (y;y) for self-matched y. Let K (n + 1) = K (n) [ ffng. Analyze
two further sub-cases:
 If n (wn) = wn or if n (wn) 6= wn and 8w 2 K (n), (n (wn);w) is not a
weakly blocking pair of (n+1;un+1), then return (n+1;un+1) and K (n + 1).
Put n   n + 1:
 If n (wn) 6= wn and there is a blocking pair (fn+1;wn+1) of (n+1;un+1) where
(fn+1;wn+1) 2 K (n + 1) and fn+1 = n (wn). Let fn+1 initiate the next
blocking pair, choosing wn+1 where wn+1 2 argmaxw2K(n+1)[V (fn+1;w)  
un+1 (fn+1)   un+1 (w)]. Match fn+1 with wn+1 and update the allocation
to be (n+2;un+2) with un+2 (wn+1) = un+1 (wn+1) + 1 and un+2 (fn+1) =
V (fn+1;wn+1)   un+2 (wn+1). Similarly, un+2 (y) = V (y;y) for unmatched y
and un+2 (x) = un+1 (x) for all other x.
Repeat this process until we reach an allocation
 
n+k;un+k
such that K (n + 1)







and put n   n + 1:
Case 2. wn 2 (F [ W)nK (n) and fn 2 K (n). This is analyzed similarly as in Case
1, with the roles of rms and workers being switched in initiating blocking pairs. This
nally yields some (n+1;un+1) where K (n + 1) = K (n)[fwng contains no blocking
pair of (n+1;un+1). Put n   n + 1:
Case 3. If every existing strongly blocking pair of (n;un) is such that (fn;wn) 2
(F [ W)nK (n), or no agent in (fn;wn) is in K (n), then construct K (n + 1) as
K (n + 1) = K (n) [ f(fn;wn)g. Let (n+1;un+1) be the updated allocation so that
fn is matched with wn; un+1 (fn) = un (fn) + 1, un+1 (wn) = V (fn;wn)   un+1 (fn);
and un+1 (y) = V (y;y) for unmatched y and un+1 (x) = un (x) for all other x.12 Put
n   n + 1:
Step 3: If allocation (n;un) contains no strongly blocking pair, then return (n;un),
11Here, (fn;wn) = 2 K (n) implies that not both fn and wn are in K (n). With some abuse of
notation, we denote both a single agent and a pair of agents as elements of K (n) or F [ WnK (n)
hereafter.
12The wage specication between fn and wn can again be specied arbitrarily here, so long as
consistent with the strongly blocking pair (fn;wn).
10which is weakly stable. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
(End)
Several remarks are in order for Theorem 1 and Basic Algorithm:
First, Theorem 1 extends Roth-Vande Vate's results to a labor market setting
with payos, with additional and careful choices of surplus division rules (wages).
The Basic Algorithm shows that to design a path toward weak stability, judicious
choices of blocking pairs and wage specication are both important. As here we
have more degrees of freedom in selecting dierent wage choices, our algorithm thus
contains a somewhat more involved and elaborate design.
Second, in the process of constructing a sequence of strongly blocking pairs to
achieve an \internally (weakly) stable" set K (n) (with its members' associated pay-
os), we let the newly introduced agent be the initiator of the next blocking pair
and we specify the surplus division rule to be \the initiator getting the lion's share
of the resulting surplus." Such a specication excludes cases where a single blocking
pair breaks multiple existing pairs, ensuring the monotonicity of payos of the non-
initiators in K (n) along the sequence of strong pair improvements in the process.
This payo monotonicity is crucial for the proof of Theorem 1.
We now present an example. The rst part of Example 2 shows that if the surplus
division rule is specied dierently, then two existing pairs of rms and workers in
K (n) can be broken simultaneously by a single blocking pair in the process, disrupting
monotonicity. The second part of the example illustrates the Basic Algorithm.
Example 2 Consider a market with F = fa;bg;W = fx;yg, V (i;i) = 0;8i 2 F [W,
and
V (a;x) = 5;V (b;x) = 5;
V (a;y) = 6;V (b;y) = 7:
Suppose that currently we have  = f(a;y);(x;x);(b;b)g with u(a) = 4;u(y) =
2;u(b) = u(x) = 0 and K = f(a;y);(x;x)g. Now introduce rm b, who can form a
strongly blocking pair with either x or y. Suppose we choose (b;x) and let the initiator
rm b obtain an additional payo of 1 after forming the blocking pair. The resulting
allocation is 0 =K0 = f(a;y);(b;x)g with u(a) = 4;u(b) = 1;u(x) = 4;u(y) = 2.
The next blocking pair is then (b;y) , which inevitably breaks both (a;y) and (b;x) , and
results in a payo of 0 for worker x, upsetting the monotonicity of workers' payos in the
process.
We next employ the Basic Algorithm to produce a weakly stable allocation for this
labor market, starting with an initial allocation (0;u0) with 0 = f(a;a), (b;b), (x;x),
(y;y)g and u0 (i) = 0 8i 2 F [ W:
























and K(1) = f(a;x)g:























and K (2) = f(a;y);(x;x)g:
























and K (2) = f(a;y);(x;x)g, which contains no strongly blocking pair of (4;u4).
Rename (4;u4) as (2;u2) and introduce rm b, who can form a strongly blocking
pair with either x or y. For future illustration, we analyze the two cases separately.

















, and K (3) = f(a;y);(b;x)g.
Allocation (3;u3) is only weakly stable with (b;y) being a weakly blocking pair.








































, and K (3) = f(a;x);(b;y)g.
Observe that allocation (4;u4) is weakly stable, as well as stable.
4 Main Results
In this section we address our central question of whether decentralized and random
processes can lead the market to a stable outcome. For this purpose, it is important
to show that starting from any initial allocation, there exists a nite sequence of
successive myopic bilateral trades toward a stable allocation. This result then implies
that the process of choosing each pair improvement with positive probability from
any unstable allocation converges to stability with probability one.
We have demonstrated in Section 3 that from any initial allocation there are
nite successive strong pair improvements leading to a weakly stable allocation in
the market. The result is not entirely satisfactory as the market value in a weakly
12stable allocation can be strictly less than the ecient value, rendering the market in a
state of ineciency and disequilibrium. To attain market eciency and equilibrium,
we now strengthen the previous result to show that given any initial allocation of a
labor market, there is a nite sequence of successive weak pair improvements that
results in a stable allocation, which is also a competitive equilibrium of the market.
Example 2 in the previous section illustrates that the Basic Algorithm may also
result in a stable allocation. This might lead to a conjecture that one can probably
modify the Basic Algorithm by employing weakly blocking pairs and imposing more
detailed surplus specications in choosing weakly blocking pairs so as to achieve
stability. However, a rst diculty of this approach is that the occurrences of multiple
blocking pairs and the specication of a \correct" blocking pair are endogenous and
typically depend on the status quo conguration and the overall market structure.
Moreover, the design of a dierent set of surplus division rules and the possibility of
cycles pose additional challenges. Consequently, the approach of directly generalizing
the Basic Algorithm by specifying more detailed choices in blocking pairs is dicult,
if not impossible.
We therefore take a dierent route. The basic idea is to construct an \internally
stable" set like K (n) that expands strictly as n increases. The crucial step is to adjust
this set to be \internally stable" after the addition of new members. In contrast to
the case of weak stability where the Basic Algorithm prevents cycles from happening
by maintaining payo monotonicity of one side of the market during the adjustment,
cycles typically arise along a path toward stability. The reason is that with weak pair
improvements, we do not have the luxury of always having additional payos to make
some members in one side of the market strictly better o during the adjustments.
We develop a novel and systematic approach to deal with cycles in a way that once the
agents arrive in a cycle, we construct a path of successive \bilateral trades " leading
the process out of the cycle, with an additional feature that the agents will not enter
exactly the same cycle afterwards. In the sequel, to ease exposition, we proceed in two
steps: In the rst, we consider a simple and \almost stable" market and present an
algorithm that generates a nite path of successive weak pair improvements towards
stability (Theorem 2). We then use this result to prove a complete paths-toward-
stability theorem for the general labor market (Theorem 3).
Consider the following restricted situation/market: For an individually rational
allocation (;u) where u is an integral payo vector, there exists a worker w0 such
that w0 is self-matched at  and such that (;u) restricted to F [(W nfw0g) is stable.
We now design an algorithm which nds a nite sequence of weak pair improvements
leading (;u) to a stable allocation. We start with several key denitions:
Given allocation (;u), dene, for each w 2 W,
Fw (u) = ff 2 F j V (f;w)   u(f) = maxfV (f
0;w)   u(f
0) j f
0 2 Fgg (1)
and let Lw be a list (linear ordering) of elements of Fw (u). We x such lists Lw for
all w 2 W whenever Fw (u) remains the same, and, starting from its rst element,
13each list Lw is used cyclically in the sense that the rst element of Lw becomes the
next rm when we reach the end of Lw.
An alternating path for an allocation (;u) from w0 is an alternating sequence of
unmatched and matched rm-worker pairs
(f1;w0);(f1;w1 = (w1));(f2;w1);(f2;w2 = (f2)); ;(fl 1;wl 1 = (fl 1));(fl;wl 1)
for an integer l  1 such that (i) all the participating agents fi's and wi's are distinct,
(ii) fi 2 Fwi 1 (u) n f(wi 1)g for all i = 1; ;l, and (iii) fi's are not self-matched.
For l  2, we also call such a sequence with the last pair (fl;wl 1) being deleted an
alternating path. An unmatched pair
 
fk;wk 1
, k  0, in an alternating path can
be interpreted as that if worker wk 1 breaks up with her currently matched rm (if
any), she would then \point to" rm fk, indicating her preferences of the next rm
she would like to be matched with.
In dealing with weakly blocking pairs, cycles typically arise. The above denitions
serve as key tools in treating such cycles in a systematic way. Roughly speaking,
Fw (u) serves as a \depository" of rms from which worker w draws a rm to form a
weakly blocking pair. Lw serves as an \index", indicating the order w should follow
in drawing rms from Fw (u). Finally, an alternating path is a device we use to spin
the process out of a cycle when the latter arises so that each adjustment is consistent
with weak pair improvements. The specic roles of these tools will be seen more
clearly in the Main Algorithm.
Now consider the following algorithm which returns a stable allocation from an
initial allocation (;u) in the restricted situation as described previously.
Main Algorithm
Step 0: If (;u) is stable, then return (;u) and stop. Otherwise, put 0    and
u0   u. Given (0;u0), for each matched w under 0, reset the list Lw cyclically
so that the very rst rm in Lw is the one that is matched with w in 0. For self-
matched w, that is, for w0, such adjustment is unnecessary and Lw0 can be the one
constructed initially. Let f0 be the rst element of list Lw0, and put k   0.
Step 1: If fk is self-matched at k, then match fk with wk. Let k+1 be the updated
matching, and put uk+1(wk) = V (fk;wk)   uk(fk) and uk+1(x) = uk(x) for other
x 2 F [ W. Return (k+1;uk+1) and stop.
Step 2: If fk is not self-matched at k, then match fk with wk (hence k(fk)
becomes self-matched). Let k+1 be the updated matching, and put uk+1(wk)  
V (fk;wk)   uk(fk), uk+1(k(fk))   V (k(fk);k(fk)), and uk+1(x)   uk(x) for
other x 2 F [ W. Also put wk+1   k(fk).
If (k+1;uk+1) is stable, then return (k+1;uk+1) and stop. Otherwise, dene fk+1 as
follows:
If list Lwk+1 is treated for the rst time, then let fk+1 be the second element of
Lwk+1; otherwise let fk+1 be the rm next to the last matched rm in list Lwk+1. Put
k   k + 1.
14Step 3: If (k;uk) = (k0;uk0) for some integer k0 with 0  k0 < k, we have got into
a cycle and go to Step 4; otherwise go to Step 1.
Step 4: Let FQ be the set of rms f whose matched workers (f) change at least
once during the cycle according to the updating of . Starting from the current al-
location (k;uk), put F    ; and let w be the self-matched worker that appeared
when k was updated. While F  6= FQ , execute the following (*):
(*) Let (;u) be the current allocation. Find an alternating path for allocation
(;uk) from w to a rm f 2 FQ n F  such that all the non-terminal rms
belong to F .13
Carry out Augment.
Augment: Proceeding in the reversed order of the alternating path, for each
unmatched rm-worker pair (f;w) in the alternating path do the following (1)
and (2):
(1) Make f matched to w and let 0 be the updated matching (by construction
of the alternating path, (f) becomes self-matched and unless w = w,
(w) also becomes self-matched).
(2) Put u(w)   V (f;w) uk(f) 1, u(f)   uk(f)+1, u((f))   V ((f);(f)),
and unless w = w, put u((w))   V ((w);(w)).
Proceed until we complete (1) and (2) for the rst unmatched pair that involves
w. Put w   (f),    0, and F    F  [ ffg.
Step 5: Denote the current allocation by (;u) again and let w0 be the self-matched
worker that appeared at the last updating of . Update lists Lw of Fw (u) for all
w 2 W. Go to Step 0.
(End)
We briey illustrate the essential idea of the Main Algorithm as follows:
Given the restricted market structure, all possible weakly blocking pairs have
to involve the current self-matched worker. In Step 1 and Step 2, we always let
the current self-matched worker initiate the next weakly blocking pair. Each self-
matched worker w chooses, according to the list Lw, a rm that generates the highest
net surplus, which is entirely awarded to the worker. Such an arrangement rules
out cases where several existing pairs are broken by a single weakly blocking pair,
disrupting certain monotonicity property as previously.
13Recall that uk is the payo vector appearing in Step 3, so that we should
nd an alternating path with respect to Fw
 
uk















, we call fl the terminal
rm and f1;f2;:::;fl 1 non-terminal rms. Notice that if l = 1, then f1 is the terminal rm
and f1 2 FQ n F.
15Figure 1. An Alternating Path from w to fl in the Execution of Augment.
Next, such a \greedy" behavior of the self-matched workers raises the possibility
of a cycle, where several workers \compete" for the same set of rms. We denote this
set of rms in the cycle as FQ. Intuitively, rms in FQ are over-demanded by the
competing workers in the cycle, which is collected in set WQ. Observe that by the
specication of lists fLwgw2WQ in Step 0, at the end of the cycle, workers in WQ face
exactly the same conguration of fLwgw2WQ as in 0 | that is, every w , w 2 WQ,
has gone through multiple integer rounds of Lw entirely, and each w 2 WQ has been
matched with every rm in Lw at least once during the cycle.
The remaining part of the Main Algorithm serves to spin the process out of the
cycle in a consistent way. To this end, we increase the payos of the over-demanded
rms in FQ, the adjustment being the smallest increment of 1. This payo ad-
justment is completed systematically using alternating paths, as shown in (*) of
Step 4. Specically, starting from the self-matched worker w appearing at the end







" such that all rms except fl are in F , a set con-
structed to temporarily collect rms in FQ that have already been treated with payo
increases. Augment in Step 4 presents formal procedures to conduct payo increases
of rms in FQ so that each adjustment is consistent with weak pair improvement.
Notice that set F  is initially empty and hence the very rst alternating path has
length 1. Alternating paths after the rst execution of Augment may, however, have
lengths more than 1.14
Figure 1 shows an alternating path from w to a rm fl 2 FQnF . The dotted
arrows connect currently unmatched pairs of rms and workers, indicating the next
rm a worker would point to if the worker becomes self-matched, while the solid
lines connect currently matched pairs of rms and workers in the alternating path. In
executing Augment, we start with the last unmatched pair
 
fl;wl 1
, and match every
14Indeed, it is possible that all alternating paths in the execution of (*) may have length 1. We
show in Example 4 that for some asymmetric markets, alternating paths with length more than 1
might have to be employed.
16pair connected by dotted arrows sequentially until we reach the pair with (f1;w).
After one round of Augment, an additional rm fl is treated with the payo increase
and is then added to set F . Moreover, worker 
 
fl
becomes the unmatched worker
w, who initiates the next alternating path for the next round of Augment if the
updated F  is not equal to FQ.
Intuitively, the complex nature of the Main Algorithm, especially in Augment,
is a direct consequence of the constraint that every involved adjustment has to be
consistent with weak pair improvements. We are now ready to prove the convergence
of the Main Algorithm.
Theorem 2 For any individually rational allocation (;u) that satises the restricted
situation, the Main Algorithm always nds a stable allocation after a nite number
of weak pair improvements.
Proof. If Step 4 is not executed throughout the algorithm, then it is easy to see the
validity of the algorithm. We next prove the validity of Step 4 when cycles arise.
Suppose that Step 4 is executed. Let FQ (resp., WQ) be the set of rms f (resp.,
workers w) whose matched partners change at least once during the cycle according
to the updating of . We rst show that whenever F  6= FQ, there exists a desired
alternating path from w to a rm fl 2 FQnF  and that all other rms involved
in the alternating path are in F . Suppose by way of contradiction that there does
not exist any such alternating path for (;uk) from w to FQ n F . Let ^ F and ^ W,
respectively, be the set of all rms and that of all workers in FQ[WQ reachable from
w by alternating paths for (;uk).15 Notice that by our construction of the cycle
and the assumption of no legitimate alternating path from w to FQnF , we have
^ F  F   FQ and ^ W  WQ. Namely, all agents reachable from w by alternating
paths for (;uk) have to be in FQ [ WQ.
Given such ^ F and ^ W and the assumption of non-existence of desired alternating
paths, we have
j ^ Fj + 1 = j ^ Wj; jFQ n ^ Fj = jWQ n ^ Wj > 0 (2)
and





where observe that Fw is dened with respect to uk. Condition (2) is derived from the
denition of ^ F and ^ W, as well as the fact that we start from the restricted situation
with only one self-matched worker and every matching arising in the cycle has only
one self-matched worker. According to (3), no worker in ^ W can be matched with
rms in (FQ n ^ F).16 Notice in particular that (2) and (3) jointly imply that matched
15Here, an agent (a rm or a worker) is reachable from w if the agent is a member in a legitimate
alternating path originates from w. By denition, w 2 ^ W.
16In addition, for unmatched pairs in the alternating paths, all workers in ^ W can only \point" to
rms in ^ F as well. See Figure 2 for a graphical illustration.
17pairs in ^ F [ ^ W are disjoint from those in





WQ n ^ W

in the sense that no
agent in ^ F [ ^ W is matched with an agent in





WQ n ^ W

.
Now during the cycle, we have a matching that matches all f 2 FQ to workers.
Equation (3) and the fact of all agents in FQ [ WQ being involved in the single cycle
then jointly imply that there must exist a matched pair (f0;w0) such that f0 2 ^ F
and w0 2 WQ n ^ W. (Notice that (i) because the cycle uses lists Lw (w 2 WQ)




, and (ii) worker w 2 WQ n ^ W cannot point to a rm f 2 ^ F
either as this contradicts the fact that ^ W is the set of all workers in WQ reachable
from w by alternating paths for (;uk).) However, f0 cannot be matched to w0
since FQ n ^ F must be matched to WQ n ^ W due to (2) and (3).17 This contradiction
establishes the existence of a desired alternating path in the execution of (*).
We next show that every adjustment executed in Augment is consistent with weak
pair improvements. Let (f1;w0= w), (f1;w1=(f1)), (f2;w1), (f2;w2=(f2)), ,
(fl 1;wl 1=(fl 1)), (fl;wl 1)) be an alternating path found in (*) in Step 4 for
some positive integer l. (Note that (fl) becomes the unique self-matched worker
after Augment, which is precisely the w for the next round of Augment.)




, these two agents were matched during the cycle.)
If l  2, we have u(fl) = uk(fl), u(wl 1) = uk(wl 1) 1 , and uk(fl)+uk(wl 1) =
V (fl;wl 1). Hence V (fl;wl 1)   u(fl)   u(wl 1) = 1. (Here, recall that by the
denition of cycle, for any f 2 FQ the value of ui(f) remains to be the same for
i = k0; ;k, and that for each w 2 WQ all the values of V (f;w)   ui(f) for f 2 Fw
and i = k0; ;k are the same. Here parameters k0 and k are those appeared in Step
3.) Hence, (fl;wl 1) is a weakly blocking pair and this validates the operations in (2)
of Augment. We make fl matched to wl 1 and update u as (2) in (*) of Step 4. (In
eect, u(fl) is increased by one and u(wl 1) remains the same.) Then fl 1 becomes
self-matched. If l = 2, then (f1;w0 = w) is a weakly blocking pair. (Recall again
that these two were matched during the cycle, so that they prefer being matched to
being self-matched.)
If l  3, we then have u(fl 1) = V (fl 1;fl 1) < uk(fl 1) + 1 = V (fl 1;wl 2)  
u(wl 2) , so that pair (fl 1;wl 2) becomes a weakly blocking pair. We then perform
(1) and (2) of Augment. We repeat this process until we make f1 matched to w0= w,
which completes an execution of Augment.
When nishing the While loop in Step 4, the utility u(f) of each rm f in FQ is
increased by one.
When we go from Step 4 to Step 5, letting wk be the current self-matched




, which implies that for any (f;w) such that f 2 F n FQ and w 2 WQ,
17Alternatively, if f0 2 ^ F is matched with w0 2 WQ n ^ W, we then cannot have that jFQ n ^ Fj =
jWQ n ^ Wj > 0 and that rms in FQ n ^ F are exactly matched with workers in WQ n ^ W.
18Figure 2. An Illustration on the Existence of Legitimate Alternating Paths.
we have V (f;w)   u(f)  V ((w);w)   u((w)), where (;u) is the nal allocation
in Step 4 when Step 4 is completed.
Every time we execute Step 4, at least one value of u(f) (f 2 F) increases and u(f)
for each f 2 F is non-decreasing throughout Main Algorithm (where we neglect the
temporary steps in which u(f) becomes V (f;f) during the execution of Augment).
Moreover, the set of possible integer values of u(f) (f 2 F) is nite. Since the number
of all the matchings for xed Fw
 
uk
(w 2 W) is bounded by jWj!, after at most jWj!
updatings of matching , we either get into a cycle, where some u(f) is increased after
the execution of Step 4, or the algorithm terminates. We therefore conclude that the
algorithm terminates after a nite number of steps.
Our proof of the existence of a desired alternating path in (*) can be further
illustrated in Figure 2: If there does not exist a desired alternating path from w
when F  6= FQ, then the set of rms (resp., workers) reachable from alternating
paths starting with w is a strict subset of FQ, ^ F  FQ (resp., a strict subset of
WQ, ^ W  WQ). This implies that rms in FQ n ^ F are exactly matched with workers
in WQ n ^ W, and these matched pairs are disjoint from the matched pairs in ^ F and
^ Wnfwg . However, the facts that (i) rms in FQ and workers in WQ are involved in
a single cycle; (ii) workers in ^ W cannot be matched with (and cannot point to) rms
outside ^ F; and (iii) workers in WQ n ^ W cannot point to rms in ^ F, necessarily imply
a link between ^ F [ ^ W with the rest of the cycle has to come from a matched pair
(f0;w0), f0 2 ^ F, w0 2 WQ n ^ W, which contradicts the established result that rms in
FQ n ^ F are exactly matched with WQ n ^ W.
We next present two examples to provide further illustration and to facilitate
better understanding of the Main Algorithm.
Example 3 Consider a labor market (F;W;V ), where
F = fa;bg;W = fx;y;zg
V (i;j) = 3, 8 i 2 F and j 2 W and V (k;k) = 0;8 k 2 F [ W.
























We have Fi (u0) = fa;bg 8i 2 W. Let Lx = ab, Ly = ba, and Lz = ab. Notice that
the rst element of Lx, a (resp., Ly, b), is currently matched with x (resp., y) in 0.
It can be veried that (6;u6) = (0;u0), a cycle, where FQ = fa;bg;WQ = fx;y;zg.

























and hence F  = fag. Choose the next alternating path to be (b;x), a weakly blocking

























The setting in Example 3 is somewhat symmetric and we always have the option
of constructing every involved alternating path with length 1. We next present an
asymmetric example, which shows that without further restrictions on choices of
alternating paths and lists Lw, we may have to construct alternating paths with
length more than 1 during the execution of Augment.
Example 4 Consider market (F;W;V ), where
F = fa;b;c;dg;W = fx;y;z;t;mg
V (k;k) = 0;8 k 2 F [ W, V (i;j) = 3, 8 i 2 F;j 2 Wnfmg
V (a;m) = V (b;m) = 2;V (c;m) = V (d;m) = 0




































Notice that Fi (u0) = fa;b;c;dg;i 2 Wnfmg and Fw (u0) = fa;bg. Lists fLwgw2W are
chosen as: Lx = cdba, Ly = bcda, Lz = cdba, Lt = dabc, Lm = ab. Proceeding as in









































18The self-matched workers in the 23 allocations can be ordered from 0 to 22 as
x;z;t;m;y;x;z;m;t;z;m;t;y;x;m;z;t;y;m;x;y;m;x:
One can also see that in obtaining this cycle, we have gone through every list Lw entirely at least once.
20where w = x;FQ = fa;b;c;dg and WQ = fx;y;z;m;tg. Rename (22;u22) as (;u):

































leaving a new w = y and F  = fbg.
































with a new w = m and F  = fa;bg.
The third alternating path, which can take several other forms but has to have length
more than 1, is:
(a;m);(a;y);(b;y);(b;x);(c;x);
where pairs with underscores are currently unmatched. We then proceed from backward
































with w = z and F  = fa;b;cg. With (d;z) being the last alternating path, an execution
































Consequently, at the start of Step 5, we have allocation (;u), which satises the restricted
situation, with a single self-matched worker w0 = t.
We now prove the existence of a deterministic sequence of nitely many weak pair
improvements toward stability for any initial allocation with full generality.
Theorem 3 Consider a labor market (F;W;V ) with an arbitrary initial allocation
(0;u0). Then from (0;u0) there exists a nite number of weak pair improvements
which leads to a stable allocation (;u).
With the help of the above result, we now develop a decentralized and random
process that always results in a stable outcome of the market with probability one. As
stated before, this process intends to mimic a natural decentralized decision making
process in labor markets where rms and workers meet directly and randomly, and
negotiate salaries over time.
21First, observe that starting from an arbitrary initial allocation (0;u0), the set of
all allocations, denoted as A(0;u0), that is reachable through a sequence of pair im-
provements of (0;u0), is a set with nite elements. To see this, rst notice that given
a labor market with nite agents, the set of all possible matchings is nite. Secondly,
for any allocation (;u) 2 A(0;u0), it holds that u(x)  minfu0(x);V (x;x)g for
every x 2 F [W.19 Together with the fact that u is integral, set A(0;u0), the family
of all possible allocations (;u) satisfying u 2 ZF[W and u(x)  minfu0(x);V (x;x)g
for every x 2 F [ W , is hence a nite set.
We now describe the random market process. Suppose that the market opens
with an arbitrary allocation (0;u0). Consider a Markov process with nite states,
where the states are allocations that are reachable via successive pair improvements
of (0;u0), or allocations in A(0;u0). The initial state is allocation (0;u0). The
transition probabilities of states in A(0;u0) are dened in a way such that for every
unstable allocation (;u) 2 A(0;u0), each pair improvement of (;u) is chosen with
positive probability. A transition probability may reect, for example, how likely
the agents involved in the corresponding pair improvement would meet and would
split the surplus once they meet, as well as the current market structure. Denote the
random sequence of allocations generated by the above Markov process starting from
the initial allocation (0;u0) as ^ P(0;u0). Given Theorem 3 and our specication
of the Markov process, it is immediate to show that the random sequence ^ P(0;u0)
converges to a stable allocation in A(0;u0) with probability one.
The above random process is mathematically convenient to describe and interpret.
However, from an economic point of view, the random decentralized market process
is chaotic and it does not seem plausible that when an unstable allocation (;u)
is reached again in the middle of the random process, the transition probabilities
associated with (;u) stay the same as before. We now discuss a similar but more
general random process with discrete time, nite states, and possibly time-dependent
transition probabilities among states. The market again opens with an arbitrary
allocation (0;u0) at time t = 0. For transition probabilities, we assume that every
(non-stationary) transition probability between two states in A(0;u0) is no less than
a xed number " 2 (0;1) at any time. As there are only two classes of states (stable
and unstable), it follows that starting from any allocation (;u) in A(0;u0) at time
t, the random process either nds a stable allocation in A(0;u0) and remains stable
afterwards, or continues to move from one unstable allocation to another unstable
allocation in A(0;u0). Now observe that the random process always arrives at
an allocation in A(0;u0), which contains only nitely many allocations. Suppose
the random process does not converge to a stable allocation with probability one in
the limit. This necessarily implies that at some point, after reaching an unstable
allocation (;u) in A(0;u0), the random process jumps among a (nite) set of
19Observe that for agent x whose payo u(x) falls below V (x;x) under (u;), her payo either
increases or stays the same after each weak pair improvement. Moreover, agent x's payo remains
individually rational once it becomes so.
22unstable allocations (associated with (;u)) in A(0;u0) innitely. As at any t in
the random process, each possible pair improvement is chosen with probability no
less than ", it further implies that there is some (0;u0) in A(0;u0) such that no
nite path of pair improvements toward stability exists, no matter how one chooses
the associated pair improvements. This, however, contradicts Theorem 3. Therefore,
the probability of the random process converging to a stable allocation must be one
as t goes to innity.
Let ^ P(0;u0;") be the random sequence of allocations generated from the ini-
tial allocation (0;u0) as described above. The previous discussion then implies the
following:
Proposition 1 For any initial allocation (0;u0), the random sequence ^ P(0;u0;")
converges with probability one to a stable allocation.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies a decentralized labor market where heterogeneous rms and work-
ers meet and negotiate salaries with each other randomly and spontaneously over
time. Firms and workers act in an uncoordinated way: They can form a partnership
or dissolve their partnership instantly whenever better opportunities present them-
selves. The key nding of our study is that such a seemingly chaotic, and random
dynamic decentralized market process converges with probability one to a competi-
tive equilibrium of the market, provided that every possible bilateral trading arises
with positive probability. To establish this result, an essential step is to show that
starting from an arbitrary initial market state, there exists a nite sequence of suc-
cessive myopic bilateral tradings which leads to a stable matching between rms and
workers with a scheme of competitive salary oers.
As a natural starting point, we have assumed in our model that each rm hires
at most one worker.20 Of course, such an assumption will not be satised in general
labor markets where some rm may employ multiple workers. An important and
natural direction for further research is hence to study a similar random decentralized
market process in labor markets where rms may hire any number of workers. It is
well known from Kelso and Crawford (1982) that a competitive equilibrium exists in
a labor market where each rm may hire several workers, as long as every rm views
all workers as substitutes. As mentioned earlier, they also proposed a centralized
adjustment process for this general market. Moreover, Gul and Stacchetti (2000),
Milgrom (2000), Ausubel (2006), Sun and Yang (2009) have developed centralized
processes for general competitive auction markets. It will be, however, signicantly
more challenging to examine such general markets from a decentralized perspective.
Another interesting question is when agents face a decentralized and random market
20This is a standard assumption used in the literature on job matching and assignment markets.
23process as the one we developed, do they have incentives to manipulate the process
so as to make individual gains in a relatively small labor market? We anticipate
developing results in these directions in future work.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. It is sucient to focus on an individually rational allocation
(0;u0).21 We now show that the Basic Algorithm returns a weakly stable allocation
(;u) after nitely many successive strong pair improvements. As the crux of
the Basic Algorithm lies in the inductive construction of K (n), we now show that
each update of K (n + 1) with the addition of new members to K (n) requires nite
successive strong pair improvements so as to reach an allocation (n+1;un+1) such
that no strongly blocking pair of (n+1;un+1) is entirely contained in K (n + 1):
First, K (1) = f(f1;w1)g where (f1;w1) is a strongly blocking pair of (0;u0)
with a consistent specication of u1 (f1) and u1 (w1). By construction, K (1) does
not contain a blocking pair of (1;u1).
Next, in our inductive construction of K (n + 1) from K (n) and (n;un), the
general rule is that whenever there is a blocking pair (fn;wn) such that either fn or
wn is in K (n), then we treat such blocking pairs rst.22 Together with the surplus
division rule specied in the Basic Algorithm, such a treatment guarantees that after
the introduction of new members into K (n), all rms (or all workers) in K (n) are
always at least weakly better o along the sequence of adjustments toward the con-
struction of K (n + 1) and (n+1;un+1) (and some strictly better o). We show this
separately for the three cases:
Case 1. If fn = 2 K (n), then fn initiates the next blocking pair with wn 2 K (n).
As fn chooses her best worker wn to form the blocking pair and she obtains the largest
possible payo that is consistent with the strongly blocking pair, fn cannot form the
next strongly blocking pair (if any) with workers in K (n). Now if wn is self-matched
in K (n), K (n + 1) does not entirely contain a blocking pair of (n+1;un+1). If wn
is matched in K (n), only n (wn) can initiate the next blocking pair with workers
in K (n) as other rms in K (n) are not aected and the payo vector of workers in
K (n) is weakly increased. This validates the operation of letting n (wn) to be the
next initiator. Finally, as all agents' payos are integral and nite, and no worker
in K (n) is worse o and at least one worker's payo strictly increases after each
strongly pair improvement, we reach an \internally stable" K (n + 1) after nitely
many steps.
21Otherwise we can start the sequence of strong pair improvements with a string of strong blocking













22See the specic statement of Case 3 in the Basic Algorithm.
24Case 2. wn = 2 K (n) and fn 2 K (n). The proof for this case is done similarly as
in Case 1.
Case 3. Every existing strongly blocking pair is such that (fn;wn) 2 (F [
W)nK (n). By the fact that K (n + 1) = K (n) [ f(fn;wn)g and payos of fn and
wn have both strictly increased, no strongly blocking pair of (n+1;un+1) is hence
contained in K (n + 1).
Finally, observe that the set K (n) constructed above strictly increases (inclusion-
wise) after each execution of Step 2. The execution of Step 2 and Step 3 hence
must terminate in nitely many steps until a weakly stable allocation is obtained, as
jFj;jWj < +1 and K (n) can grow no larger than F [ W.
Proof of Theorem 3. It is again without loss of generality to consider an in-
dividually rational initial allocation. We prove the result by induction on an index
q  1.
For q = 1, we rename (0;u0) as (1;u1). If there is a matched pair (x;y) at 1,
then dene A(1) = fx;yg; otherwise we choose any self-matched agent x and dene
A(1) = fxg.
Suppose for an integer q  1 that we have
1. an individually rational allocation (q;uq) such that uq(x) = V (x;x) for self-
matched x 2 F [ W, and
2. a non-empty set A(q)  F [ W such that there are no weakly blocking pairs
within A(q) and such that q does not match any agents in A(q) with agents
in (F [ W) n A(q).
Notice that this is true for q = 1. If (q;uq) is stable, then we are done. Otherwise
there exists a weakly blocking pair, and we consider the following three cases.
Case 1: there exists a weakly blocking pair (f0;w0) with f0 2 A(q) \ F,
Case 2: there exists a weakly blocking pair (f0;w0) with w0 2 A(q) \ W, and
Case 3: there exists a weakly blocking pair (f0;w0) with f0;w0 = 2 A(q) and neither
Case 1 nor Case 2 applies.
Here observe that at most one of such f0 and w0 can belong to A(q).
In Case 1, let
A(q + 1) = A(q) [ fw
0g: (4)
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25Denote w0 by w1
q+1 and the new q by 
q+1
1 . Update uq so that uq(x) = V (x;x) for
all self-matched x 2 F [ W. Denote by u
q+1
1 the updated uq.
Now we have the following fact:
There exists no weakly blocking pair within A(q + 1) n fw
1
q+1g: (5)
Next notice that by the choice of w1
q+1(= w0), there exists a weakly blocking pair
within A(q + 1), and that (5) holds due to property (2) of A(q). Apply the Main
Algorithm to A(q+1) to obtain an allocation such that there exists no weakly blocking
pair within A(q + 1). We then proceed the induction step from q to q + 1.
Case 2 is similar to Case 1.
In Case 3, we dene q+1 by making f0 matched to w0 and also dene uq+1 similarly as
in Case 1, together with some payos of f0 and w0 that are consistent with a weakly
blocking pair. Next, dene A(q + 1) = A(q) [ ff0;w0g. It is then clear that there is
no blocking pair within A(q + 1).
We eventually obtain a stable allocation by repeating this whole process for at
most jF [Wj times, since we have a strictly increasing (inclusion-wise) sequence A(q),
where q = 1;2;:::.
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